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BALANCING EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY -
TOWARD MARKET-BASED HEALTH CARE
WILLIAM R. ROPER, M.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Like some stubborn malady, health care cost inflation in
recent years has resisted all economic and regulatory reme-
dies. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has estimated that, in 1987, the nation spent nearly $2,000
for every man, woman and child to pay for health care. This
includes the costs of hospital stays, physician visits, and other
personal health care, as well as funding for health insurance,
public health services, and health-related research and con-
struction activities.'
While official cost estimates will not be available until
June 1988, total national health care expenditures in 1987
probably reached $497 billion, or 11 percent of the Gross
National Product. Spending on hospital care, which accounts
for approximately 40 percent of national health expendi-
tures, rose an estimated 7.3 percent. Spending on physician
services, which accounts for another 20 percent of the na-
tional health-care budget, rose 10 percent in 1987. These
cost increases were significant factors contributing to an over-
all rise of 8.4 percent in national health care expenditures.
The increase in spending between 1986 and 1987 was no
higher than the increase in health care spending between
1985 and 1986, the year of the second-lowest increase in
spending within the last two decades. The projected annual
rate of increase in national health expenditures from 1986 to
* Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
1. All health-care cost data and demographic projections in this re-
port are from the DIVISION OF NATIONAL COST ESTIMATES, OFFICE OF THE
ACTUARY, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.
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2000 is 9.0 percent, compared to an annual rate of 12.1 per-
cent between 1965 and 1986. Nonetheless, medical costs will
continue to outpace the rate of economic growth and may
account for 15 percent of the GNP by the year 2000.
Physician costs especially must be addressed. Physician
costs were a major factor in producing a 38.5 percent in-
crease in the 1988 premium for Medicare's optional Part B,
which covers physician and outpatient care, as well as pre-
mium increases for private health insurance ranging from 10
to 70 percent.2
A portion of the spiralling cost of medical care is justifia-
ble and even inevitable. To begin with, America is aging.
The aged population is expected to grow rapidly until the
mid-1990's. After a temporary slowdown, this growth will re-
sume again, peaking by the year 2035. Increased costs are
also a function of the increased use of more sophisticated
medical technology. Some increase in costs should be ex-
pected, for it indicates the health care system is improving
and functioning well for patients. Few would be so hard-
hearted as to fault services that save and prolong lives by en-
hancing medical efficiency merely because such services also
increase costs.
Nonetheless, the continued high rate of health-care
spending growth can and must be addressed, as part of the
"morning after" of fiscal reckoning. Many financial experts,
including former U.S. Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson,
have stated this day of reckoning is inevitable because of
years of improvident fiscal practices. Mr. Peterson's prescrip-
tion for health-care spending constraint is to replace what he
terms the "horrendous, indeed perverse inefficiencies" of the
current health care system with the discipline of market
forces.' One of the primary virtues of the "market" is its po-
tential to combine appropriate incentives with local decision-
making. Government, and particularly the federal govern-
ment, is not an appropriate mechanism for deciding whom to
pay, or for what to pay. Local, private competing organiza-
tions should make these decisions. Government's' proper role
is to set broad guidelines for this activity. Yet such a revolu-
tion in health-care also poses a serious challenge: can we
make our health-care system more decentralized, more af-
2. Kramon, Insurance Rates for Health Care Increase Sharply, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
3. Peterson, The Morning After, Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1987, at 43,
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fordable and more efficient while maintaining high quality
care? Physicians and patients, businesses and unions, and gov-
ernment and private insurers alike must band together to
meet this challenge.
While payments from private health insurers and direct
payments from patients account for over half of all health-
care spending, the Federal Medicare program remains the
largest single payer of hospital and medical bills, meeting
about 20 percent of these costs. The experiences gained from
Medicare are instructive to all efforts to control medical
costs. Further, the fiscal decisions of Medicare manifestly in-
fluence the economics of health care. This article describes
the steps Medicare has taken and will continue to take to ful-
fill the Reagan Administration's mandate to control health
care costs and maintain quality care by increasing reliance on
market forces and on appropriate incentives.
I. MEDICARE: A CASE IN POINT
A "Great Society" program established in 1965, Medi-
care today insures some 32 million elderly and disabled
Americans at a total estimated cost in 1987 of $80 billion,
approximately 8 percent of the federal budget. Spending for
Medicare has increased each year during the Reagan Admin-
istration. The average increase in spending from Fiscal Year
1981 to Fiscal Year 1986 was 11.7 percent per year.
Medicare is divided into two parts. The Hospital Insur-
ance Program (Part A) is funded through mandatory payroll
deductions collected in the Hospital Insurance (HI) trust
fund. Part A covers acute-care hospital stays, skilled-nursing
care, and hospice and home-health care at an estimated 1987
cost of $49.1 billion. The Supplementary Medical Insurance
Program (Part B) is optional and covers physician and outpa-
tient care, as well as medical equipment and supplies. Premi-
ums charged to enrolled beneficiaries pay for 25 percent of
Part B, with general federal revenues making up the differ-
ence. In 1987, Part B grew 16 percent over 1986 costs, for a
total of about $31.7 billion.
Between 1980 and 1987, Congress enacted more than 30
laws governing Medicare. In attempts to achieve savings, the
Congressional budget process was often used to engineer ma-
jor legislative changes in the program. Many of these changes
have made the Medicare program difficult to understand, let
alone to administer. The many changes affecting Medicare
have produced three major reforms:
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" The Prospective Payment System (PPS) for inpatient ser-
vices by hospitals participating in the Medicare program;
" The Participating Physician Program, which permits
beneficiaries to choose doctors who accept the Medicare
rate for various services as payment in full; and
• The Private Health Plan Option (PHPO), which gives
Medicare beneficiaries the option to enroll in private
health plans such as health maintenance organizations
and competitive medical plans.
II. THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM
A. Payments to Hospitals
During its first 15 years Medicare paid hospitals under a
fee-for-service system. Under this system a hospital billed for
each service rendered and the government reimbursed rea-
sonable costs, the costs actually incurred in delivering effi-
cient care for necessary services. This system drove Medicare
hospital costs beyond even the wildest estimates of the pro-
gram's architects. Medicare Part A (the Hospital Insurance
Program) benefits grew an average of 18.5 percent per year
between fiscal years 1967 and 1983. In 1983 the Reagan ad-
ministration and Congress inaugurated a major change in
hospital reimbursement known as the Prospective Payment
System (PPS).
PPS was enacted to stem the growth of hospital costs
while ensuring continued access to high-quality care. PPS es-
tablishes advance payment rates and pays this amount for
each discharge, regardless of the costs actually incurred. Pay-
ments are calculated on the basis of the average cost of treat-
ing a patient with a particular condition, as organized by 473
categories known as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). If the
hospital can treat the patient for less, it keeps the balance; if
it cannot, the hospital absorbs the loss.
PPS makes one fixed payment for a cluster of services
associated with a hospital stay. This payment method elimi-
nates needless services and promotes the most cost-effective
ways of diagnosing and treating illnesses. Short-stay acute
care hospitals are now included under PPS, and studies are
underway to develop a DRG-type system for psychiatric, re-
habilitation children's and long-term care hospitals.
It will be several years before the full impact of PPS can
be measured, largely because of "cushions" built into the leg-
islation to ease the transition to payments based on national
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rates. During the first four years of PPS, the payment rate
for a hospital was calculated on a combination of its historical
costs and a federal rate based on national and regional costs.
The relative weight of each factor has changed annually to
shift gradually to the federal rate. In addition, certain types
of hospitals are accorded special treatment, including teach-
ing hospitals, sole community providers, regional referral
centers and cancer hospitals. Despite these transitional rates,
some conclusions can be drawn. In the five years prior to the
passage of the Social Security Reform Act of 1983, which
created PPS, Part A expenditures were growing at an aver-
age annual rate of 17 percent. In the five years since PPS was
first enacted, this rate of growth has been reduced to 6 per-
cent." Because PPS pays per case rather than per service, it
was anticipated that the new system would foster admissions
as a way to generate more hospital revenue. Contrary to ex-
pectations, however, hospital admissions declined 9 percent
during the first three years of PPS.
PPS offers dramatic new incentives for efficiency. PPS
has been successful in holding down costs because it encour-
ages more appropriate use of intensive hospital services and
directs Medicare beneficiaries to more appropriate and less
costly types of treatment. For example, the use of home
health care services has escalated rapidly. These services are
defined as part-time skilled health care and other therapeutic
care provided in the patient's home by a Medicare-approved
agency. Medicare home-health payments increased from $1.3
billion in 1982 to $2.7 billion in 1986, while the number of
certified home health agencies rose during the same period
from 3,600 to about 6,000. These services, having benefited
from new medical technology, respond to an increased cost
consciousness among hospitals and insurers.
B. The Problem of Profitability
One common way to review the financial impact of PPS
on hospitals is to examine profits, or "operating margins."
This figure shows the percentage of revenues from Medicare
payments that remain after deducting the expenses incurred
in treating Medicare beneficiaries.
4. All PPS hospital data is taken from a report by Stuart Guterman
and Allen Dobson, "Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System
for hospitals," 7 Health Care Fin. Rev. 97, (1986), published by HCFA's
Office of Research and Demonstrations, as well as updates from HCFA's
Bureau of Data Management and Strategy.
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DRG rates are updated annually by the Congress. The
HCFA now has three years of data for hospital performance
under PPS rates and updates. This data shows that hospitals
in general did quite well during the first two years of PPS,
with operating margins averaging 14 percent each year. The
high Medicare margins were partially a result of rates being
set too high, for they were based on unaudited cost data from
1981. It also reflected the success of PPS in encouraging hos-
pitals to change their practices, particularly in reducing
length of stay and furnishing certain services in less costly
settings.
These profit margins prompted many to suggest ways to
recoup excessive hospital profits. HCFA has maintained,
however, that the prudent means to control excessive profits
was gradually to give hospitals smaller updates that would
make up for the initial overstatement of hospital costs. As a
result of this policy, the data from the third year of PPS show
that Medicare margins for fiscal year 1986 were reduced to
almost 9 percent on average.
As the size of the PPS update declined, there was also a
corresponding increase in the cost per case. Falling admis-
sions have made it difficult for hospitals to control this in-
crease because costs are spread over fewer cases. As a result
of these and other factors, including the increase in severity
of illness of hospital patients, costs-per-case have increased an
average of 10 percent annually between the first and third
years of PPS. The decline in hospital operating margins can
best be envisioned as a graph on which two lines intersect: a
declining line which denotes the declining increases in the
hospital payments rates, and a rising line indicating rising
costs-per-case.
The problem is that PPS is a centrally administered price
payment system and does not produce competition. Hospitals
compete only to maintain or increase patient volume. Despite
recent success in holding down the rate of growth, costs con-
tinue to rise and the rate of increase is again accelerating.
HCFA has focused increasing attention on some of the rea-
sons for the continuing increase in the cost per case of PPS.
We could conclude the Medicare system has not been apply-
ing sufficiently firm pressure to hospitals to control costs. Al-
ternatively, the current system may have given hospitals a dif-
ficult, if not impossible, task. It is open to question whether
hospitals can control their costs further. A central issue is the
degree to which hospitals truly can control physician deci-
[Vol. 3
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sions, for these decisions predominantly drive health
spending.
Given the declining hospital occupancy rates in many
parts of the country, a major step to hold down Medicare
hospital spending is to close some hospitals. As PPS has
pinched more tightly in rural America, Congress has re-
sponded with special rules and higher payment updates for
rural hospitals. Some changes were warranted and even advo-
cated by HCFA as sound policy. Although observers recog-
nize that some rural hospitals should change or even close,
other proposed changes are designed to protect these hospi-
tals. Unfortunately, it now appears the process will become
increasingly politicized, to the point where local issues receive
greater emphasis than national policy.
Payment at rural hospitals is particularly problematic
under PPS, as it relies on national economic forecasting tools
to deal with varying local markets. Adornment of a national
program with local "fixes" underscores fundamental
problems with such a nationally-administered price system.
Consequently, it is doubtful that hospital spending under
Medicare can be restrained further using PPS alone. While
this system has faults, PPS is far superior to cost-reimburse-
ment programs. For example, PPS is unable to reduce exces-
sive utilization by physicians.
III. BURGEONING PART B
The Part B program was designed to conform to prac-
tices in private health insurance existing at the time of its en-
actment. Medicare uses a system for calculating physician
payments based on actual, customary and prevailing charges.
Under this system, the Medicare payment is the lowest of
three figures: the physician's actual billed charge, the physi-
cian's customary charge (the median actual charge during the
previous year) or the prevailing charge (the 75th percentile
of the customary charges of all physicians in a geographical
area). The resulting part B payment is called "the reasonable
charge." In 1972, Congress established a Medicare Economic
Index (MEI) to limit annual growth in the prevailing charge.
About 20 percent of Medicare Part B spending is attributable
to hospital outpatient services. Another 10 percent is spent
on medical equipment, ambulance services and laboratory
costs. Physicians' services, however, make up 65 percent of
Part B payments and effectively drive Part B spending.
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Over the ten-year period ending in fiscal year 1983,
Medicare spending for Part B physician care increased by an
average annual rate of approximately 20 percent. The aver-
age annual growth of GNP for this period, however, was less
than 10 percent. Two major weaknesses of the reasonable
charge system contributed to these escalating costs. First, rea-
sonable charges did not decline when improvements in tech-
nology or surgical techniques resulted in lower production
costs. Second, reasonable charge payment offers no incentives
for appropriate utilization of services. Indeed, about 42 per-
cent of the increased costs during the last five years of this
period was due to increased intensity of services, especially
with more complex and expensive procedures.
In 1984 Congress sought to constrain Part B growth
with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA). A
temporary freeze was placed on customary and prevailing
charges. A Participating Physician Program was also estab-
lished. A participating physician chooses to accept "assign-
ment" in any given year. The physician agrees to accept the
standard Medicare fee, together with Medicare's established
deductible and beneficiary co-payments, without further
charges billed to the patient. Two basic incentives are offered
for joining the Participating Physician Program. First, partici-
pating physicians are listed in a directory made available to
beneficiaries. Second, DEFRA allowed participating physi-
cians to raise their actual charges when other physicians'
charges were frozen, so that such increases could be reflected
in the calculation of their customary charges for future years.
The prevailing charges of non-participating physicians are set
at 16 percent of those of participating physicians.
Beginning with the passage of the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), attention was
also focused on selected procedures which appeared to have
inherently unreasonable prevailing charges. For example,
technological improvements may have reduced the time and
effort required for a procedure after the initial payment level
was established. Under this "inherent unreasonableness" con-
cept, payments for cataract surgery, including anesthesia,
have already been lowered. Changes in the payment rates for
other selected procedures were included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconcilation Act of 1986.
The long-term growth trend in Medicare physician
spending was cut roughly in half between fiscal years 1984
and 1986. Spending increased at a compound annual rate of
11.7 percent for this period, compared to an annual increase
[Vol. 3
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of nearly 20 percent between 1975 and 1983. This slowdown
can be attributed both to the hospital prospective payment
system and to part B reforms, including the 22-month freeze
on physician fees (which was extended to 30 months for non-
participating physicians). Nonetheless, this rate of growth was
still double the rate of growth in the GNP. Persistently high
rates of increase in Medicare expenditures continue to pose a
problem for elderly beneficiaries. Since enrollee premiums
must cover 25 percent of Part B costs, these added physician
charges helped contribute to the $6.90 increase in the
monthly Part B premium of $24.80 for 1988. In fact, $2.40
of this increase reflects new, higher estimates of Part B
spending during 1987, and another $3.00 reflects projected
increases in 1988.
HCFA has concluded that the most significant over-
looked contributor to rising Part B costs is not price increases
per unit of service, but "net residual factors," as termed by
the Board of Trustees of the Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance Trust Fund.' These factors include costs from addi-
tional physician services per enrollee, use of more expensive
techniques, and increased reliance on specialists rather than
on primary care physicians.
Yet it remains unclear that increases in utilization have
improved the quality of medical care. Research on practice
patterns conducted by Dr. John Wennberg of the Dartmouth
Medical Center and Dr. Philip Caper of the Codman Re-
search Group indicates that wide variations in practice pat-
terns exist without producing clinically meaningful differ-
ences in outcome.6 Indeed, now is the logical time to question
what has long been a fundamental premise of the American
health care system: "More is better." More is not necessarily
better. We seriously need to examine practice patterns and
the effectiveness of different medical interventions to reach
consensus about what care is appropriate and actually
needed.
5. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., IST.
SEss., BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE INCREASE IN THE SMI ENROLLEE PRE-
MIUM FOR 1988 19 (Comm. Print 1987). See also statement by William L.
Roper, M.D., Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration before
the [House] Comm. on Ways and Means, September 30, 1987.
6. Wennberg, Population Illness Rates Do Not Explain Population Hospi-
talization Rates, 25 MED. CARE 354,359; Caper, Outcome Assessment for the
Purposes of Epidemiological Surveillance, PIoc. OF QUALITY OF CARE RESEARCH
SYMPOSIUM (June 11, 1987).
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In our search for ways to constrain Part B spending
growth, using incentive payment systems like PPS for doctors
will be difficult. There are far more Part B providers than
hospitals, the volume for each Part B provider is much
smaller, and there are vast differences among providers be-
cause of specialization. These factors produce significant pric-
ing problems. Uniform fee schedules, such as a relative value
scale to value individual services in relation to each other,
could bring greater equity to discrepancies between proce-
dural and cognitive services. Such fee schedules, however,
would also fail to address utilization growth, a major compo-
nent in rising Part B costs. The best cost-control mechanism
for physician services is a competitive system that allows pa-
tients to choose among high-charging, over-utilizing physi-
cians and those who practice more appropriately for more
reasonable fees. This might occur through the creation of a
preferred provider network.
The private sector increasingly uses preferred provider
networks (PPOs) to direct beneficiaries to selected providers.
Plan administrators enroll providers that offer high-quality
care at favorable prices. Provider performance is assessed
through utilization review, and poor performers are excluded
from the network. Both volume and price limits are necessary
if total costs are to be reduced. While there are no utilization
controls under the Participating Physician Program, a pre-
ferred provider network would add them.
IV. THE PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN OPTION
The Private Health Plan Option is to tomorrow what the
Prospective Payment System was three years ago - the next
logical step. PHPO embodies the Reagan Administration's
guiding principles for Medicare by: (1) reducing govern-
ment's direct role in medical and pricing decisions; (2) in-
creasing choices, both for beneficiaries and for providers of
care; (3) promoting competition among private organizations
that deliver health care; and (4) sharpening the industry's in-
centives for efficiency.
Under the Private Health Plan Option, each Medicare
beneficiary is given the choice of remaining in the traditional
Medicare program or participating in Medicare through en-
rollment in a private health plan. Once a beneficiary enrolls
in a private health plan, Medicare pays the plan a monthly
lump sum equal to 95 percent of Medicare's costs for the av-
erage beneficiary. This payment is adjusted according to cer-
tain characteristics such as age, sex, county of residence, and
[Vol. 3
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other factors. In return, the plan assumes financial and medi-
cal responsibility for the beneficiary's total care. There are
currently two enrollment options: Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations (HMOs) and Competitive Medical Plans (CMPs).
Many HMOs and CMPs offer greater benefits than those
provided under Medicare. Deductibles and copayments are
often smaller or are nonexistent. One hundred and fifteen
managed-care plans provide prescription drugs. Joining a pri-
vate plan also reduces paperwork for older Americans, be-
cause the plan itself handles the claims. Since the government
is no longer the primary insurer under PHPO, its regulatory
burden is lessened. Doctors and hospitals are given a more
direct role in deciding how to control the utilization of ser-
vices, how to finance services, and how to control the quality
of services.
The confusion surrounding appropriate payment rates
for physicians and hospitals under PPS is also a powerful ar-
gument for the Private Health Plan Option. Government
simply cannot develop fair payment rates as quickly as market
forces. PHPO offers physicians the chance to participate in a
variety of private organizations delivering health care at pay-
ment rates that are decided locally. This would eliminate the
difficulties of setting national payment rates.
In the five years since the passage of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which gave Medicare bene-
ficiaries the right to choose a managed-care alternative, about
1,000,000 elderly American people have chosen to leave
traditional Medicare and join a private plan." However, the
success of PHPO cannot be measured simply in terms of the
number of people who have joined such plans. The real crite-
rion is choice. Currently, about one-half of America's Medi-
care beneficiaries live in areas where at least two competing
private plans are available in addition to traditional Medicare.
The HFCA is eager to offer even more Medicare benefi-
ciaries this choice. -
But the question now becomes: what is HCFA doing to
offer the privately-managed care industry the opportunity to
fulfill its role in the continuum of health care services in to-
day's America? The Reagan Administration is now engaged
in a market test of PHPO, for Medicare, to prove the pro-
gram can operate in a fair and beneficial manner: fair to the
7. Statistics on the Private Health Plan Option are from the DIVISION
OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF QUALIFICATION, OFFICE OF PREPAID
HEALTH CARE, HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., OPERATIONAL REP. (Feb. 1, 1988).
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private plans doing business with Medicare, so these plans can
grow; and beneficial to the consumers served, so they can
promote the concept to others. The PHPO test program op-
erates under real market conditions. To that end, on Septem-
ber 9, 1987, HCFA announced an increase of 13.5 percent in
the Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) used to com-
pute the payments to HMOS and CMPs for calendar year
1988. This compares to a 4.6 percent increase in 1987.
There are perceived flaws in the AAPCC, however. The
HCFA plans to ask all managed-care plans with Medicare risk
contracts if they would participate in a demonstration pro-
ject. This project would test a payment method that better
reflects the effect of an enrollee's health status on HMO
costs. The current AAPCC uses only demographic informa-
tion in setting payment rates. HCFA would like to add diag-
nostic information as well, based on information from the
previous year's hospitalizations among current enrollees at an
HMO. Many times knowing the reason for a hospital admis-
sion can greatly help in predicting the enrollee's future need
for higher levels of care. This refined model is known as the
Diagnostic Cost Grouping method (DCG). Under DCG, pay-
ment rates would depend on where the diagnosis fell within
eight pre-defined risk categories known to be reliable
predictors of future health care costs.
HCFA has also moved forward with additional demon-
stration projects testing the expansion of the private health
plan option with employment-based groups. Such groups in-
clude Taft-Hartley trusts, unions, and self-insured employers.
This concept, known as Medicare Insured Groups (MIGs), of-
fers several distinct advantages. MIGs can provide a more ac-
curate prediction of the future health care expenses of large
groups, thus allowing for more accurate payment rates. Bene-
ficiaries can stay in the same plan that provided coverage dur-
ing their working years, rather than being forced to make an
artificial switch at retirement. Through the unified adminis-
tration of basic Medicare coverage and fund-provided supple-
mental plan benefits, the MIG may be more efficient and
thereby provide additional benefits to retirees. A MIG can
eliminate the need for retirees to file multiple claims. It can
also help ensure continuity of care, just as managed-care itself
gives more continuity to a patient's total care.
HCFA has already signed a tentative MIG agreement
with the Amalgamated Life Insurance Company, which ad-
ministers health insurance benefits for one-half million work-
ers and their families. This includes some 130,000 retirees
[Vol. 3
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and their spouses participating in certain Taft-Hartley trusts
sponsored by the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work-
ers Union. This agreement reflects HCFA's conviction that,
while Medicare cannot and should not set the pace for the
private sector, it can and must keep pace.
V. QUESTIONS OF QUALITY
Senior-citizen advocacy groups have alleged in recent
years that PPS has prompted hospitals to discharge Medicare
patients "sicker and quicker." The Prospective Payment As-
sessment Commission compiled the results of reviews of hos-
pital readmissions under PPS. This study found that only 1.6
percent of hospital readmissions within 15 days were the re-
sult of premature discharge. In February 1988, the Office of
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services released a study of the hospital records of 7,045 ran-
domly selected Medicare patients discharged from October
1984 through March 1985. The sample indicated that only
0.8 percent of all Medicare discharges were premature. Yet
everyone recognizes the importance of running the nation's
Medicare program in a way that not only assures access and
controls costs, but also sets a proper standard of quality care.
HCFA's quality-assurance efforts are focused in three major
areas: the dissemination of information on hospital mortality
rates; the latest developments in peer review; and quality-as-
surance in the field of managed-care.
A. Measuring Hospital Mortality Rates
In 1986 HCFA issued information on mortality rates at
the nation's hospitals. This information was intended for use
by hospital-care monitoring groups. It was disseminated to
the public following a Freedom of Information Act request.
HCFA clearly stated those lists did not necessarily indicate
good or bad providers of care. Yet the HCFA did learn the
public liked having this information, and this service will con-
tinue. To further a more competitive health care system,
consumers must be given appropriate information on which
to base choices.
The problem, however, is that mortality rates are just
one piece of a large picture - these rates are important but
incomplete. HCFA is also well aware of the effect the release
of such information can have on physician behavior and on
the hospital industry. For these reasons, in late 1986 and
throughout 1987 HCFA consulted individuals with a wide
19881
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range of expertise in health policy, health services research,
and statistics. These experts assisted HCFA in developing a
policy for the public release of appropriate information on
hospital mortality rates.
On December 17, 1987, HCFA released its Medicare
Hospital Mortality Information, which documents mortality
rates at nearly 6,000 short-term acute care hospitals nation-
wide that treated Medicare beneficiaries in 1986. The seven
volume report contains figures reflecting the overall mortal-
ity rate for Medicare patients at each hospital, as well as the
mortality rates in each of 16 diagnostic categories, such as
cancer, kidney disease, and stroke. Each hospital's actual
mortality rates were compared with HCFA's calculation of
the mortality rate that could have been expected for the hos-
pital, given the characteristics of patients it treated. A range
rather than a point estimate was used to avoid implying that
the predicted mortality was more precise than it actually is.
In addition, each hospital was given the opportunity to com-
ment on its own statistics. These written comments were pub-
lished in the report.
Admittedly, this information would be more accurate if
more precise methodologies were available, allowing for full
adjustment for the severity of illness and other factors. Nev-
ertheless, the information does contribute to our overall
knowledge about hospital performance. If interpreted prop-
erly, this information can benefit physicians, hospital adminis-
trators and peer review organizations.
B. Peer Review
The Peer Review (PRO) program is HCFA's primary
tool for assessing quality health care. The PRO program, first
enacted into law in 1982, has developed rapidly. As indicated
by its legal title, "Utilization and Quality Control Peer Re-
view Organizations," PRO review activities first focused on
utilization control. HCFA sought to avert potential "gaming"
of the new prospective payment system through improper or
unnecessary admissions or frequent readmissions. Once it had
been established that admissions had actually decreased
under PPS, HCFA re-oriented the scope of PRO work in
1986 to emphasize quality of care. The PROs review approx-
imately 25 percent of all hospital admissions, or 2.5 million
cases annually. Every reviewed case is examined to determine
if the care provided meets professionally-recognized stan-
dards of quality.
[Vol. 3
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Each reviewed case is compared to a set of generic qual-
ity screens which focus on: discharge planning, medical stabil-
ity at discharge, unexpected deaths, unscheduled return to
the operating room and trauma suffered in the hospital.
These screenings ensure an extremely broad quality review.
PROs also review all readmissions occurring within 15 days
of discharge, if the readmission is thought to be related to
that discharge. Hospital transfers are also reviewed. PROs
soon will be phasing in review of hospital readmissions occur-
ring within 31 days of discharge. Payments for readmission
will be denied if the PRO finds a premature discharge caused
the readmission.
Recent Congressional actions have assigned HCFA new
tasks that significantly broadened the duties of the PROs in
assuring quality. They also raised some sensitive and complex
issues. For instance, Congress has authorized PROs to deny
payment for substandard care. The idea of classifying care as
"substandard," however, raises many questions. Questions
concerning mandatory review of elective surgical procedures
and the requirement of a second surgical opinion in certain
cases are also raised, and the HCFA is proceeding carefully in
these matters, encouraging input, and will issue proposed
rules for public comment. The HCFA already has issued in-
structions to require PROs to review the use of assistants dur-
ing cataract surgery.
As a result of another congressional mandate, hospitals
are now prohibited from turning away or transporting to an-
other facility any patient who is in immediate need of ser-
vices. Since August 1, 1986, all Medicare-participating hospi-
tals providing emergency services have been required to meet
new requirements for emergency medical screening, stabiliz-
ing, treatment and transfer of patients. As part of their pro-
vider agreement, these hospitals must also provide medical
screening examinations and stabilizing treatment for individ-
uals with emergency medical conditions and women in active
labor. The penalty for knowingly, willingly, or negligently
failing to meet these requirements for ANY of these individ-
uals, not just for Medicare beneficiaries, is termination or sus-
pension of the hospital's Medicare provider agreement.
HCFA has terminated two hospitals and has issued 29 termi-
nation notices. These notices were rescinded only after the
hospitals had fully corrected the problems causing the inap-
propriate transfer of patients. This swift response to allega-
tions of "patient dumping" demonstrates to the hospital com-
munity that this behavior will not be tolerated.
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Indeed, whenever PROs find quality problems they take
appropriate action. The enforcement philosophy emphasizes
rational action based on facts and seeks to identify problems,
to educate, and to correct practice patterns where necessary.
But if the circumstances merit, HCFA will not hesitate to in-
voke the most severe penalties available, from payment deni-
als to exclusion from the Medicare program. The decision to
impose such drastic sanctions should not be made lightly.
Physicians and providers are given several opportunities to
refute or correct any identified deficiencies. For peer review
to work, the reviewer must be a true peer and knowledgeable
about the standards of medical practice in the area of con-
cern. HCFA has issued a reminder, for instance, that rural
practice must be reviewed by PRO physicians who practice in
a similar setting. Only this can ensure genuine peer review.
C. Quality and Managed Care
The quality of care received by Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in private health plans has been criticized in recent
months. In April 1987, for instance, a Senate committee re-
leased a preliminary report about the Medicare HMO/CMP
program. Unfortunately, HCFA was not given an opportu-
nity to review the report, nor was it made clear to the public
that its findings could not be generalized in a scientific way to
all Medicare HMOs. Rather, the report was based on anecdo-
tal information - and not even much of that. The so-called
"evidence" cited in the report consists of 37 anecdotes rang-
ing back to 1983. It is entirely misleading to base conclusions
on such skimpy evidence. -
Nevertheless, HCFA believes that even one quality-of-
care problem is one too many. HCFA also recognizes
problems in marketing practices and in enrollment and dis-
enrollment procedures. At HCFA's request, legislation has
been passed to impose civil monetary penalties whenever
medically necessary services are denied or inappropriate mar-
keting procedures practiced. 8
In order to contract with the Medicare program, HMOs
and CMPs must first undergo a rigorous eligibility process to
review their fiscal solvency, health service delivery system, in-
ternal quality-assurance program, and marketing practices.
8. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION AcT OF 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
509, 100 Stat. 1874; OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILATION AcT OF 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330.
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Once a contract is signed, HCFA continually monitors the
plans to assure their compliance with eligibility requirements.
Medicare's quality review of managed-care plans considers
the appropriateness of medical treatment and the setting in
which care is delivered. The review focuses on several areas
in which concerns about private plans have been expressed,
such as the potential for underutilization of medical services
in a private plan, the ease of access to medical services, and
the timeliness of the services provided. There are three levels
of review - "limited," "basic," and "intensified." The re-
viewing organization will analyze the private plan's internal
quality-assurance process before determining the intensity of
review. Thus private plans have incentives to strengthen
their own quality-assurance systems. Not only will they re-
ceive a less intensive level of outside quality review, but they
will also benefit by attracting consumers with a tough quality-
assurance system. Quality review is necessary to ensure the
long-term future of Medicare's private health-plan option.
This option will not succeed unless the American people are
convinced that managed-care in the Medicare program is
care of high quality.
CONCLUSION
In seeking to compare the effects of a regulatory system
with a free market approach in containing health care costs,
the course of public policy toward health care since 1965
should be considered. The regulatory approach has been
tried with some effect, but overall without much success.
Regulation stifles initiative and interferes with the ability of
doctors and hospitals to practice medicine as they see fit. For
this reason President Reagan sought to introduce more com-
petition into the health care system. This effort is not yet
complete. But the HCFA believes that competition will ulti-
mately have two beneficial effects on American health care.
First, competition will constrain costs more efficiently than
regulation could. Second, and more importantly, it will help
the Medicare system to preserve and enhance quality in
health care.
Although it may appear to be a major departure from
past policies in Medicare financing, the Private Health Plan
Option is not a radical program. On the contrary, it reflects
mainstream American values. PHPO relies on market incen-
tives rather than on government regulation to keep costs rea-
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sonable, while it respects the independent professional judg-
ment of physicians.
In the 62nd Essay of the Federalist Papers, James
Madison wrote:
It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made
by men of their own choice if the laws are so voluminous
that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot
be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they
are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that
no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it
will be tomorrow.9
Madison's observations are certainly as cogent as ever, and
they apply with equal force to the Medicare system. In health
care, long-term solutions need to focus on decentralization,
competitive forces, and incentives for the appropriate use of
medical services. We must resist telling ourselves that old
ways are the best ways and commit ourselves to the enter-
prise ahead.
We believe our policy is one of vision tempered by prag-
matism. We believe that a more competitive, decentralized
system of private providers and of educated consumers will
ensure a bright future for health care in America, at a price
affordable to all.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 381 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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